When evaluating the initial wave of optimism surrounding the easing of sanctions and the flurry of diplomatic agreements in Damascus last year, I placed a modest yet fundamental caveat on the nature of postwar economic recovery in my previous articles: A change in political leadership or the opening of an international legitimacy window cannot erase decades of accumulated structural damage overnight. Back then, while welcoming the reopening of the Damascus Securities Exchange and the signing of memorandums of understanding (MoUs), I emphasized that the most daunting hurdles were yet to be cleared, summarizing the reality ahead: The political transition may be complete, but in terms of constructing a sustainable economic order, the real struggle is just beginning.
As Syria approaches the two-year mark of the post-Assad era, field data clearly illustrates exactly which fronts this "economic struggle" is concentrated upon.
To be sure, there is undeniable economic dynamism on the ground. Türkiye's bilateral export volume to Syria surged 26.4% year-over-year to $1.28 billion in the first half of 2026, driven by a record 116.8% increase in cement shipments. Meanwhile, the return of over 1.2 million Syrians has revitalized domestic demand, putting earlier pessimistic growth scenarios to rest.
