The next great resource contest is not over oil. It is over lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements, the minerals without which no battery charges, no wind turbine turns, and no electric motor runs. Major powers have recognised this.The United States has committed $12 billion to strategic mineral stockpiling. The European Union has signed 15 supply partnerships. China already controls the refining of most of what the world needs. India has recognised it too, but recognition, so far, has not translated into urgency.A concentrated supplyThe world’s supply of critical energy transition minerals (CETMs) is concentrated in the hands of a very few. The top three countries control 91 per cent of global cobalt mine output, 90 per cent of rare earth production, and 86 per cent of both graphite and lithium mine output.China alone accounts for 69 per cent of rare earth production and 78 per cent of natural graphite mining. Indonesia controls 67 per cent of global nickel mine production. The Democratic Republic of the Congo produces 74 per cent of the world’s cobalt.More critically, refining, where the real economic value is captured, is even more concentrated. China dominates the refining of rare earths, lithium, and cobalt. Indonesia controls 43 per cent of global nickel refining capacity.Ambition without securityIndia has set itself some of the most ambitious clean energy targets in the world: 500 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, aggressive EV adoption targets, and a rapidly growing semiconductor manufacturing ambition. Each of these goals is mineral-intensive. Batteries need lithium, cobalt, and nickel.Wind turbines and EV motors need rare earth permanent magnets. Semiconductors need speciality minerals. Solar panels need copper and silicon.India currently produces negligible quantities of most of these minerals domestically. It has limited refining capacity. And it has no significant strategic stockpile to buffer against supply disruptions, unlike Japan, which subsidises up to 50 per cent of eligible CETM project costs and maintains government-backed stockpiles, or the United States, which in 2026 launched Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private critical mineral reserve. The gap between India’s clean energy ambitions and its mineral security posture is, at present, very wide.India already accounts for 4.4 per cent of global rare earth permanent magnet imports, a figure that will only grow as EV and wind capacity expand. Nearly all of it traces back to Chinese refining, a dependency that receives far less policy attention than it deserves.The UNCTAD report documents that since 2020, nearly 100 new export restrictive measures have been introduced on CETMs globally: 37 licensing requirements, 31 export taxes, and 29 export bans. China alone has introduced 16 measures, predominantly licensing requirements framed around national security.The message is clear: countries that control critical minerals are increasingly willing to use that control as strategic leverage. India, as a major importer with limited alternative sources, is exposed to precisely this leverage.The diplomatic gapThe UNCTAD report identifies India as one of a small group of major economies leading the expansion of CETM bilateral partnerships, alongside the EU, the US, Canada, Indonesia, and Japan. This recognition is welcome. But recognition of intent is not the same as demonstrated capacity.The United States signed 11 bilateral mineral frameworks at a single ministerial meeting in February 2026, involving 54 countries. The European Union has signed 15 strategic mineral partnerships, backed by a €2 billion European Investment Bank financing commitment. Japan has formalized agreements with Angola, the DRC, and Namibia, with subsidies covering up to half the project costs.India’s bilateral engagement, while growing, has not yet reached a comparable scale, speed, or financial commitment. The window for securing favourable partnerships with mineral-rich nations, particularly in Africa and Latin America, is competitive and narrowing. Countries like the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Zambia are being actively courted by multiple major powers simultaneously. India cannot afford a leisurely diplomatic pace.What the evidence demandsA clear-eyed look at India’s position yields four conclusions:First, India’s clean energy transition is currently built on a foundation of mineral dependency that has not been adequately acknowledged or addressed at the policy level.Second, the global window for securing favourable supply partnerships, processing investments, and diplomatic positioning is competitive and time-sensitive. The major powers are moving fast. India is moving, but not fast enough.Third, India possesses genuine assets, significant rare earth deposits that remain underexploited, a large and growing manufacturing base, and diplomatic credibility with mineral-rich developing nations that could be leveraged more effectively than they currently are.Fourth, the risk of inaction is asymmetric. If India acts and the global mineral landscape stabilises, the cost is a manageable investment in processing and diplomacy. If India does not act and supply disruptions occur, or if China uses mineral export controls as geopolitical leverage, the cost to India’s energy transition and industrial ambitions could be severe and lasting.India’s clean energy ambitions are real and commendable. But ambition without mineral security is architecture without a foundation. The global race for critical minerals is already well underway. India needs to run analytically, strategically, and with conviction.The writer is an Assistant Professor at Symbiosis Institute of International Business (SIIB), Pune. Views expressed are personalPublished on July 10, 2026