WANG SON-TAEK The agreement to end the Iran war has triggered intense debate over its lessons. Among the many interpretations, one of the interesting approaches is a comparison with the Suez Crisis. According to this view, just as Britain was forced by American pressure to withdraw from Suez in 1956, the United States may now be entering a period of decline in which it loses its position as the hegemonic power. But does the analogy really offer the most useful insight into the Iran crisis? Probably not. The two cases differ significantly in their historical context, strategic structure and geopolitical environment.At first glance, the Suez Crisis and the Iran war do share certain similarities. In both cases, stronger military powers won battles but failed to achieve their broader political objectives. The stronger powers even suffered a loss of prestige. Yet the differences are more important than the similarities. Many commentators describe Suez as the moment Britain ceased to be a global hegemon. Historically, however, that interpretation is misleading. By 1956, the United States had already assumed global leadership. Britain had effectively lost its position as the world's dominant power during World War II. By the time of the Suez Crisis, London simply lacked the capacity to resist American pressure.The significance of Suez was therefore not that Britain lost its hegemonic status. Rather, it was forced to recognize a reality that already existed. British leaders acted as though Britain still possessed the strategic freedom of a global empire, only to discover that the international balance of power had fundamentally changed. For this reason, the Suez moment offers only limited insight into the Iran crisis. Fortunately, however, we can find more useful lessons elsewhere in history.One such case is Athens' Sicilian Expedition in 413 BC. The campaign originated in domestic political division. The ambitious Alcibiades advocated an invasion of Syracuse in Sicily, while the more cautious Nicias opposed it. Unable to resolve the dispute, Athens adopted an uneasy compromise and allowed both men to share command. Even before major operations began, Athens' political dysfunction undermined the campaign. Alcibiades was recalled to face charges at home and subsequently defected to the enemy camp of Sparta. The expedition ended in disaster, and the defeat marked the beginning of Athens' long and fatal decline.The American attack on Iran was obviously not as catastrophic as the Sicilian Expedition. Yet there are similarities. In both cases, military action was launched under politically absurd circumstances, producing flawed strategy and inadequate planning. Many of US President Donald Trump's advisers were initially reluctant to support military action against Iran, and the MAGA movement itself became deeply divided over the conflict. Trump did not listen to his advisors, but he was persuaded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose strategic calculations differed significantly from American. Under such conditions, it was difficult to formulate a coherent long-term strategy.Washington underestimated Iran's willingness to resist and failed to anticipate the broader consequences of a prolonged confrontation. Iran did not capitulate. Instead, rising energy prices and economic pressures increased the urgency for the United States to end the war quickly. Before and after the conflict, Trump made little effort to build a diplomatic coalition. The result was strategic isolation.Another instructive case is Chinese Emperor Yang of Sui's invasions of the ancient Korean kingdom of Goguryeo in the early seventh century. After ascending the throne in 604, the emperor launched major campaigns against Goguryeo, all of which failed. The ruler who regarded himself as the supreme authority in the world suffered repeated military humiliation at the hands of a smaller neighboring kingdom.The tragedy was largely self-inflicted. There was no urgent strategic necessity to invade Goguryeo. Seeking glory and determined to succeed where his father had failed, Emperor Yang mobilized an enormous army in 612 to crush Goguryeo once and for all. Yet he underestimated his opponent, overestimated his own capabilities and entered the war unprepared. The result was military defeat, humiliation and eventual political collapse.A third instructive case is Louis XIV's War of the Spanish Succession. Confident in France's military superiority and political influence, the Sun King expected a favorable outcome and believed he could reshape the European balance of power. Instead, the war lasted thirteen years, drained state finances, increased taxes and encouraged other European powers to unite against France. Louis XIV ultimately succeeded in placing his grandson on the Spanish throne. Yet the cost was enormous. To preserve even that limited objective, he was forced to make major concessions and abandon broader ambitions. The ruler who had hoped to dominate Europe ended the war worrying about France's survival.Trump's experience bears some resemblance. Like Louis XIV and Emperor Yang, he entered an unfavorable conflict with excessive confidence. He underestimated Iran's determination and capabilities and assumed that military pressure would quickly produce the desired political outcome. Instead, the war proved far more complicated than expected. Reality was less accommodating than his assumptions, and the final settlement fell well short of the objectives initially proclaimed by his administration.The lessons from the historic examples are straightforward. A war requires a compelling cause. Military strategy and logistics must be carefully and effectively prepared. Leaders must cultivate domestic and international support. Above all, they must avoid underestimating the enemy and overestimating themselves.The broader lesson is not that America is doomed to decline. Unlike Athens, the Sui emperor or the Sun King, the United States still possesses immense economic, military and institutional advantages. History suggests that great powers decline not because of a single military setback but because they fail to learn from their mistakes. If Washington can overcome domestic polarization, rebuild trust with allies and pursue realistic objectives abroad, the Iran war may become a painful lesson rather than the beginning of a larger decline. In that case, America may well remain a hegemon for decades to come.- - -Wang Son-taekWang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.