Much will be written in the coming months over who the “victor” of the conflict in the Gulf is, even though none of the participants can truly claim the title. Yet, with Iran seemingly wrestling the United States and Israel to a bitterly fought stalemate, it may well be the most popular candidate in the debate.
This is largely because Iran, with its regime having faced an existential threat, has contributed to the redefinition of how a state defends itself and deters future aggression. Understanding the mismatch between its own capabilities and US firepower, it adopted a region-wide offensive campaign to externalize the cost of war. And it worked.
What we have witnessed, not only in the Gulf but also on the battlefield of Ukraine, is confirmation that traditional defensive doctrines are simply less effective in confronting many contemporary threats. The logistical, technological, and economic asymmetries favor the aggressor, and act as a handicap for the defender.
This means that a strong defensive posture along borders or fault lines, often seen as part of deterrence by denial, seems increasingly less likely to succeed. This is because traditional deterrence by denial seeks to forestall hostilities by eroding the confidence of the aggressor that any strategic or tactical objectives can be successful, a sentiment increasingly hard to project successfully.
