Debates about middle power diplomacy first emerged after the Cold War. Led by countries like Australia and Canada, middle powers were cast as supporters of the US-led liberal international order — both by complying with existing rules and by joining the ranks of norm-setters in new issue areas.
In South Korea, discussions of middle power diplomacy that emerged in the mid-2000s have since come to influence successive governments’ policies. While Seoul rarely labels its approach as ‘middle power diplomacy’, for some two decades it has nevertheless advanced visions and programs that stress South Korea’s contributions to regional and global norms-building, so as to enhance its status and influence.
During that time, the middle power agenda was peripheral to Seoul’s foreign policy, overridden by ‘hardcore issues’ of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and securing peace on the peninsula. Seoul placed primary focus on its alliance with the United States and on managing relations with Japan, China and Russia. Middle power diplomacy was viewed as a prestige project, not a matter of survival.
As US–China rivalry intensified from the mid‑2010s, the nature of Seoul’s middle power diplomacy began to change. The 2017–22 Moon Jae‑in administration’s diversification drive — especially the New Southern Policy which focused on improving ties with ASEAN and India — reflected concerns about excessive trade dependence on China. The 2022–25 Yoon Suk‑yeol administration aligned more closely with Washington’s Indo‑Pacific strategy by seeking linkages with US-led minilateral groupings. South Korean middle power diplomacy moved towards hedging — building networks and redundancy to cushion diplomatic shocks, while remaining firmly anchored in a US-led framework.
