Today’s threats are different, but the challenge of anticipating the unexpected remainsLast updated: September 11, 2026 | 04:585 MIN READIn this file photo commercial aircraft United Airlines flight 175 approaches the south tower of the World Trade Center as smoke billows from the north tower in lower Manhattan, New York on September 11, 2001. AFPTwenty-five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the world’s security landscape has changed almost beyond recognition. Al Qaida no longer dominates strategic thinking as it once did. Instead, great-power competition, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence and disinformation increasingly occupy policymakers’ attention.However, one lesson from 9/11 has aged remarkably well. It is not simply that terrorism remains a threat, nor that intelligence agencies must collect more information. Rather, it is that national security ultimately depends on a state’s ability to anticipate change before it becomes a crisis.That may sound obvious. In practice, however, it remains extraordinarily difficult.Connecting the dotsMuch of the discussion surrounding 9/11 has focused on intelligence failures. But this description is only partially accurate. The United States possessed considerable intelligence about Al Qaida before September 2001, including multiple warnings that Osama bin Laden intended to strike American interests.The problem was not an absence of information. It was an inability to convert scattered information into strategic understanding.The 9/11 Commission famously described this as a “failure of imagination.” Two decades later, that phrase deserves renewed attention, not because governments lack imagination, but because institutions often become prisoners of their own success.Security organisations are designed to create order, standardise procedures and reduce uncertainty. Those are essential qualities. Yet the very processes that make institutions effective can also make them intellectually cautious. Threat assessments increasingly reflect established assumptions, while success breeds confidence that future threats will resemble past ones.History repeatedly shows the opposite.Strategic surprise rarely occurs because information is unavailable. More often, it occurs because decision-makers struggle to imagine familiar capabilities being employed in unfamiliar ways.Passenger hijackings and suicide terrorism were well understood before 2001. Few imagined that commercial airliners themselves would become strategic weapons.The lesson extends well beyond terrorism.A new security landscapeToday’s security environment is defined less by entirely new threats than by novel combinations of existing ones. Artificial intelligence amplifies disinformation. Cyber operations accompany conventional military campaigns. Commercial drones provide capabilities once reserved for advanced militaries. Satellite networks, undersea cables, financial systems and global logistics have all become strategic infrastructure vulnerable to disruption.The recent conflict between Israel and Iran demonstrated precisely this evolution.Beyond missile exchanges, the conflict underscored how modern warfare extends into cyberspace, critical infrastructure and global commerce, with Gulf states managing the broader economic and security consequences despite not being direct belligerents.For the GCC, this is perhaps the most enduring relevance of 9/11.Over the past quarter century, Gulf states have significantly strengthened aviation security, intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism capabilities. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now internationally respected partners in these fields.But today’s strategic challenge is no longer simply preventing another terrorist attack.It is ensuring that governments remain intellectually agile enough to recognise emerging forms of risk before they become strategic surprises.From strategic curiosity to strategic foresightThis requires cultivating what might be called strategic curiosity.Strategic curiosity means continually questioning prevailing assumptions, searching for weak signals of change and rewarding thoughtful dissent before events force governments to do so. Often, the most dangerous threat is the one that does not yet fit existing analytical frameworks.Closely related is the need for strategic foresight.Unlike traditional forecasting, strategic foresight explores multiple plausible futures and asks not only what is likely, but also what could happen and how resilient institutions would be if it did.Scenario planning serves a similar purpose.Governments have long conducted military exercises. Increasingly, they should also conduct strategic exercises that simulate cascading crises: cyberattacks coinciding with regional conflict, disruptions to global shipping alongside energy market volatility, artificial intelligence-enabled disinformation during diplomatic crises, or simultaneous attacks on digital and physical infrastructure.Such exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they expose hidden vulnerabilities before adversaries do.Turning information into insightThe quality of intelligence itself also matters.Modern governments are inundated with information from satellites, open-source intelligence, artificial intelligence and social media.The challenge is no longer collecting information. It is distinguishing meaningful signals from overwhelming noise.Effective intelligence therefore depends less on technological sophistication than on analytical discipline. Data must be evaluated, corroborated and placed within a broader strategic context. Analysts must distinguish between isolated incidents and emerging patterns. Equally important, intelligence must be communicated in ways that help policymakers understand uncertainty rather than obscure it behind excessive confidence.This is where advances in intelligence studies offer important opportunities.Structured analytical techniques such as red teaming, horizon scanning and alternative futures analysis have become increasingly sophisticated over the past two decades. These methods are specifically designed to reduce cognitive bias, challenge institutional assumptions and improve decision-making under uncertainty.None of these tools eliminates surprise.But together they significantly improve the odds that governments will recognize emerging risks before they become national crises.Preparing for the next surpriseThe Gulf is particularly well positioned to embrace this approach.Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have demonstrated a willingness to invest in advanced technologies, digital governance and long-term strategic planning. Vision 2030, the UAE’s forward-looking planning culture and growing investments in artificial intelligence all provide foundations for integrating more sophisticated foresight into national security institutions.The next step is ensuring that technological investment is matched by analytical innovation.Artificial intelligence and big data can identify patterns, but they cannot replace human judgment or strategic thinking.The enduring legacy of 9/11Ultimately, the decisive advantage will belong not to the state that collects the most information, but to the one that asks the best questions.That, perhaps more than anything else, is the enduring lesson of September 11.The tragedy was not merely that intelligence agencies failed to connect the dots. It was that too few people imagined the picture those dots could form.Twenty-five years later, the challenge facing governments is remarkably similar.The next strategic surprise is unlikely to arrive in exactly the form anticipated by intelligence assessments or policy papers. It will almost certainly emerge at the intersection of technologies, actors and vulnerabilities that are individually familiar but collectively unexpected.For Gulf policymakers, that is not a reason for pessimism. It is a reminder that resilience begins not only with stronger institutions, better technology or greater military capability, but with a mindset that remains intellectually restless.The greatest tribute to the victims of 9/11 is not simply remembering the past. It is ensuring that governments never become so confident in today’s understanding of security that they stop imagining tomorrow’s.Dr Kristian Alexander is a geopolitical analyst who previously worked as a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Security & Defense Institute (Abu Dhabi), as well as Trends Research & Advisory (Abu Dhabi)Related Topics:Get Updates on Topics You ChooseUp Next