[Man-Ki Kim] Was Korea a genuine choice in Canada’s submarine competition — or leverage against Germany?

Korea Herald

Canada’s decision to select Germany’s TKMS as the preferred supplier for up to 12 new submarines deserves respect. Canada has the right to choose the platform and partnership that best serve its national interests.Yet the outcome has raised an uncomfortable question in Seoul: Was Korea ever genuinely positioned to win, or did its bid ultimately strengthen Canada’s negotiating position with Germany?Canada describes the process as rigorous and competitive and the decision as close. However, the outcome raises legitimate questions about how strategic, industrial and technical considerations were weighed. From the perspective of global defense procurement, three questions merit attention.First, were the factors that ultimately shaped the decision clearly reflected in the request for proposals?A fundamental procurement principle is that bidders should be evaluated against the criteria specified in the RFP. In defense acquisition, those criteria may legitimately extend beyond technical performance to include NATO alignment, Arctic operations, industrial benefits and geopolitical interests.But if Canada had already concluded that NATO alignment, a European strategic partnership, or participation in the German-Norwegian submarine framework would outweigh technical capability, delivery readiness and industrial capacity, those priorities should have been clearly reflected in the RFP and its evaluation criteria.If material considerations not disclosed to bidders in the RFP ultimately determined the outcome, a losing bidder could reasonably question whether the competition was conducted in accordance with the published rules.Second, if NATO alliance considerations were decisive, why was Hanwha Ocean retained as a finalist?Canada knew from the outset that South Korea was not a NATO member. Nevertheless, it selected Hanwha Ocean as the qualified bidder, invited both Hanwha and TKMS to submit proposals and continued the clarification process through April. Therefore, Hanwha had reason to believe it remained a genuine contender.If NATO interoperability means the ability to operate effectively with NATO forces, Korea could credibly claim to meet that requirement. Korean defense systems already operate in several NATO countries, demonstrating that technical interoperability does not necessarily require formal alliance membership.However, if NATO interoperability were interpreted as requiring formal alliance with NATO, only the Korean government could do so by entering a formal alliance with NATO, an unlikely prospect under current geopolitical realities. These requirements are political conditions that Hanwha could not overcome through technological capability, price or delivery performance.If such considerations were decisive evaluation criteria in the RFP, Canada could have eliminated Hanwha before requesting a costly final proposal. Advancing Korea to the final round, despite potentially insurmountable political disadvantages, inevitably raises questions about whether it ever had a realistic chance of winning.Third, did Korea help Canada secure a stronger package from Germany?Encouraging competing bidders to improve their offers is a legitimate way to achieve better value. The more difficult question is whether Canada’s underlying acquisition strategy favored a NATO supplier while continuing to signal publicly that Korea remained a serious alternative.In October, Prime Minister Carney, Defense Minister David McGuinty and Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee visited Hanwha Ocean’s shipyard, inspected its facilities and boarded the proposed KSS-III submarine. Months later, South Korea dispatched the Dosan Ahn Changho across nearly 14,000 kilometers of the Pacific to Canada to demonstrate its operational capability. Hanwha and One Team Korea offered an operational submarine, accelerated delivery, long-term sustainment support and substantial Canadian industrial participation, confident they had a genuine chance of winning the competition.Canada ultimately selected TKMS’s 212CD, a next-generation design not yet in operational service, citing NATO interoperability, Arctic capability and broader strategic benefits. Germany’s proposed partnership now appears to extend beyond a submarine purchase, encompassing industrial participation and broader strategic cooperation — an approach that resembles key elements of Korea’s “One Team Korea” package.None of this proves that Korea was used as leverage. But it raises a legitimate question: Would Germany have offered Canada the same pricing, delivery commitments, industrial benefits and broader strategic partnership if Hanwha had not emerged and been publicly treated as a serious, technically competitive alternative?Canada may not be able to disclose classified assessments or details of its negotiating position. It can, however, provide greater clarity on how technical performance, delivery, cost, industrial benefits, NATO interoperability and strategic considerations were evaluated.At the same time, One Team Korea deserves recognition. The government, Navy and defense industry mounted an impressive campaign, dispatched an operational submarine across the Pacific, and presented a credible vision for long-term industrial cooperation. The effort demonstrated that Korea’s shipbuilding and defense industries can compete at the highest level in the global defense procurement market as a unified team. The capabilities demonstrated and lessons learned from the Canadian competition can now serve as valuable strategic assets for One Team Korea as it implements the MASGA initiative and advances Korea’s proposed nuclear-powered submarine program.The competition may not be over yet. TKMS holds preferred-supplier status, not a final contract. Pricing, delivery, industrial participation and sustainment remain subject to negotiation. If Canada and TKMS cannot reach an agreement, Hanwha remains the reserve supplier. One Team Korea should remain engaged and prepared.Canada and South Korea are like-minded middle powers with shared interests in maritime security, economic resilience and a rules-based international order. In the spirit of their long-standing partnership, Canada should provide reasonable assurance that Korea was treated as a genuine strategic option — not as leverage to secure a better deal with Germany.- - -Man-Ki KimMan-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He serves as program director of KAIST’s Integrated Global Market Program and Defense Export Development Program. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed