A false-color image of the United Kingdom acquired by the European Space Agency's Sentinel-3A satellite. Credit: ESA
There is only technology. How it is employed is a question of intent, context and political will, not of the technology itself. A precision optical payload captures imagery whether the target is a forest fire or a forward operating base. Autonomous rendezvous and proximity operations software closes distance on a piece of debris or an adversary asset according to instruction, not category. The knife cuts bread or threatens a neighbour; the capability is the same. The term “dual-use” has always obscured this, but in the present strategic environment it has become worse than imprecise. It has become a distraction.
The problem isn’t semantic. Dual-use implies a meaningful boundary between civilian and military technology, and by extension between civilian and military life. That boundary has never been as clean as the term suggests, and Russia’s sustained campaign against European society has made it close to meaningless. Jamming, sabotage, election interference, drone incursions, poisonings, cyber operations against critical national infrastructure; none of these target the military first. They target the population, the politics, the communications and the morale. The British Defence Secretary has spoken publicly of a 30% rise in Russian vessels threatening United Kingdom waters. Major Tedman of UK Space Command has described satellite jamming as a weekly occurrence. This is not grey-zone activity of the kind that can be parcelled off to uniformed professionals and left there. It is a form of pressure applied across the whole of society, and it requires a response that runs through the whole of society.
