Last time I wrote about AI writing your C# and leaving the input validation out. This is the next...
Meta's recovery agent exposed 20k Instagram accounts in June because the authorization check lived in the prompt, not in code. For AI agents accessing sensitive data, enforce authorization in the tool layer (hard boundary), not prompts—prompt rules are soft boundaries that attackers bypass.
Last time I wrote about AI writing your C# and leaving the input validation out.
This is the next layer up.
The AI is not just writing the code anymore. In a lot of new products, it is becoming part of the code path. It is the agent sitting in front of your data, deciding which tool to call, which record to fetch, which action to take, and how to respond to the user.
And the most common way teams try to secure that agent does not actually secure anything.
They put the rule in the prompt.
Agent governance is no longer optional. OWASP Top 10 for Agentic AI, EU AI Act compliance deadlines, and $670K+ shadow AI…
AI agents are moving from chat into action. They can call tools, send emails, update records, delete...
A practical guide for AI SaaS builders to secure CLAUDE.md, Cursor rules, MCP configs, prompts, and retrieved context before…
Your RBAC, PAM, SIEM, and MFA were all built for human actors. AI agents are not human. Here is the...
Picture this: you write a requirement. Clear, specific. The agent reads it, does exactly what you...
Picture this: you write a requirement. Clear, specific. The agent reads it, does exactly what you...
