Europe’s security environment has undergone a profound transformation over the past decade. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have reshaped threat perceptions across the continent, while growing doubts about the reliability of US security guarantees have deepened this shift. Together, these developments have led European policymakers to reconsider the foundations of deterrence.
Against this backdrop, debates over a European nuclear deterrent—long considered politically unrealistic—have regained traction. France stands at the center of this discussion, increasingly seeking to “Europeanize” its nuclear doctrine. Yet a fundamental question remains: is a European nuclear deterrence framework becoming a strategic reality or does it remain largely aspirational?
The path to European nuclear deterrence
In an article published by Foreign Policy entitled “The Covert French Connection,” Richard H. Ullman details the process that led France to develop its own nuclear capability in the early 1960s. He asserts that the Eisenhower administration was not inclined to assist France in developing its nuclear enterprise and was hesitant to share its nuclear weapons information. Successive US administrations’ reluctant cooperation with the French force de frappe, alongside shifts in US strategic doctrine, reinforced President Charles de Gaulle’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy and France’s pursuit of an independent nuclear posture. It also ultimately contributed to France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 and its decision not to participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.
