Making a deal means the US finding a position that doesn’t threaten the Iranian regime’s survival. The alternative is a prolonged and damaging stalemate
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fter months of war, the US has struggled mightily to compel Iran to restore stable passage through the strait of Hormuz, let alone accept Washington’s core demands – the abandonment of Iran’s nuclear programme, dismantlement of its missile forces and cancellation of its regional proxy networks. Iran’s military is badly degraded and its regime disrupted, but as of today it continues to prevent most countries from shipping oil, gas, fertiliser and helium through the strait. The global economy is at risk, Donald Trump’s domestic approval is sliding, Russia is profiting, and US military preparedness – particularly in the Indo-Pacific – is suffering.
The US is superior to Iran on every measure of national power that matters. It possesses military forces of overwhelming scale, the world’s largest economy, and the ability to cut nations off from global markets through the power of the dollar. Why has Iran been able to frustrate the US’s designs so thoroughly?
The core problem is that while Trump has claimed to be negotiating, in practice he has relied almost exclusively on military and economic pressure rather than the give and take of real diplomacy. A more workable approach would offer Tehran assurances and incentives substantial enough to make the risks of signing a deal with Washington worth taking. And it would respect the red lines that the regime has showed it will not budge on.











