In the letters section of this newspaper a few weeks ago reader Jeremy Samson expressed frustration at the “bland” Sens notifications he often encounters, “filled with self-congratulatory boardroom speak”. “Why can’t they tell it like it is?” Samson asked, lamenting the “sugary drivel” that “takes liberties” in embellishing the story behind the numbers. Samson may also have been implicitly referring to market prints that not only embellish but also seek out convenient scapegoats. Such literary licence was on display in the recent data print from miller and consumer goods group RCL. Lamenting an 8.6% earnings decline, dragged down by lower sugar and pet food results, RCL placed the blame squarely on the “absence of effective tariff protection”. Readers could not be blamed for believing from this that the domestic sugar industry has been hung out to dry, with no tariff protection from cheap imports, but that is far from the case. The domestic sugar industry in fact enjoyed (until a recent decision) a $680/tonne price floor, such that when world market prices declined the corresponding ad valorem tariff rose 0%-105% the further world market prices went beneath the “floor”. While sensitive to the structural distortions that necessitate this level of protection, the distortions of overproduction (and our relative role as holders of a negligible share of global production) are not unique to sugar. Despite its partial liberalisation from the control board broederskap of the apartheid era, the domestic sugar market has retained vestiges of the old order (such as its own act, regulations and a single-channel export monopoly).Even under the World Trade Organisation dispensation it retains tariff ceilings (or bound rates) at more than 100%. Compare this to steel (where the highest ceilings are at 30%) or cement (where tariff ceilings are at 0% ― allowing no further adjustment). At the price floor that coincided with RCL’s reporting period the adjustment in the sugar tariff triggered in February raised the ad valorem equivalent duty to about 67%. That is rather different from the “absence” RCL suggests. Is it enough? Maybe not, but show me how many other industries faced by similar chronic overproduction enjoy similar levels of protection in the tariff concessions South Africa signed onto in the 1990s. The sugar industry in fact enjoys extensive policy space that allows for the delinking of domestic prices from world market prices ― second to none. The recent decision by the ministers of trade and finance, on the recommendation of the trade regulator, the International Trade Administration Commission, to raise the price floor to $785/tonne reflects the difficult balances policymakers need to achieve. While it may be fair comment to suggest that the level of the tariff may not be adequate (or too far from 105%), that is a matter of preference, policy and technical judgment. So too is it a function of the policy limits of tariffs as an instrument. It is something altogether different to claim an “absence” of protection. The recent decision to amend the price floor not only considered the world market price (adjusted for structural distortions) but also the cost differentials in producing South African sugar relative to markets where sugar enjoys dual circulation (for human use and bio-ethanol). It recognised that the playing field is not fair but also that any policy changes visit a distributional burden on downstream users too. To avoid “telling it like it is”, as Samson suggested, is to trade factual accuracy for agitational commentary while hiding important detail behind the brevity of curt market statements.• Cawe is chief commissioner at the International Trade Administration Commission. He writes in his personal capacity.Business Day