Man-Ki Kim The biggest change in the Korea-US alliance may not be the exercise Washington cut short. Instead, look at what the United States is asking Korea to provide. Across industries — from shipbuilding to next-generation artillery — Korean capabilities are important where American capacity is constrained. The $350 billion investment framework offers an opportunity to help rebuild US industries and embed Korean technology, management and know-how in that renewal.The curtailed exercise matters. Seoul is right to demand consultation and the restoration of combined readiness. But the episode exposed a weakness: Much of the alliance conversation begins with Korean anxiety and ends with American reassurance. The alliance needs a more durable foundation — one grounded not merely in reassurance but in capabilities that each country would find difficult to replace.That is what I mean by “mutual indispensability.” It does not mean replacing one dependency with another. Rather, it means building capabilities that are hard to substitute, useful in a crisis and valuable across the Pacific. Done well, such cooperation would give Korea more room to act and make the United States more capable.The timing is hardly academic. North Korea’s economy is estimated to have grown by 3.5 percent in 2025. Its cooperation with Russia yields revenue, battlefield experience and lessons in drone warfare. Seoul and Washington must strengthen deterrence against a North Korea with more resources and greater battlefield experience while preserving a path to dialogue.As the frontline state deterring North Korea, South Korea shoulders a larger share of the defense burden and must invest in its capabilities. Seoul is preparing a 2027 defense budget of 71.8 trillion won ($52 billion), about 9 percent higher than the 2026 level. The question is no longer whether Korea is spending enough. It is whether this spending builds capabilities that make the alliance stronger and more resilient.The $350 billion investment framework enables Seoul to answer that question. It allocates $150 billion to shipbuilding and $200 billion to other strategic investments. This should not become a bundle of deals, let alone a payment for tariff relief. Korea should manage it as a portfolio. Projects should receive support when they embed Korean capabilities in critical US industries, strengthen the joint defense base or enhance Indo-Pacific deterrence.Shipbuilding is the place to start. The Congressional Budget Office expects the US battle-force fleet to decline from 295 to 283 ships in 2027, then recover. American shipyards are grappling with backlogs, worker shortages and limited capacity.A recent presidential memorandum opened a small but historic door. Under the so-called “Finland Model,” qualified foreign suppliers may build the first two vessels in up to three ship classes. In return, they must invest in US shipyards, train American workers, license production technology and move subsequent construction to the United States. National-security reviews and congressional notification would still apply.Korea is well positioned to pursue this opportunity. Its yards have skilled workers, functioning supply chains, and experience with Aegis destroyers and advanced submarines. Korea can help fill an urgent near-term capability gap while the United States rebuilds its industrial base.Seoul should put a shipbuilding compact on the table: joint design, initial construction in Korea where permitted by US law, investment in American yards, worker training, local supply chains and long-term maintenance. Ships delivered and workers trained would carry more weight than another ambitious communique.Nor should the strategy stop at the waterfront. Korea has leverage in semiconductors, batteries, nuclear energy and advanced manufacturing. The United States offers extended deterrence, global reach and technologies that Korea cannot replicate quickly.The US Army’s artillery decision illustrates what that can look like. Hanwha Defense USA received the sole award to deliver six wheeled Mobile Tactical Cannon prototypes, with an option for 12 more, for soldier trials to assess a potential M777 replacement. If those trials lead to fielding and full production, Korean technology will be part of the Army’s future fires architecture.This is how Seoul can gain a voice in the alliance. Instead of waiting for Washington’s next demand, Korea can arrive with projects that address both American and Korean problems. There is a difference between paying into an alliance and helping to shape what it should become.Discipline is essential. Not every investment labeled strategic will be commercially sound, and government direction cannot create indispensability. Intellectual property must be protected, and benefits must reach workers and firms in both countries. Above all, interdependence should expand Korea’s choices rather than quietly narrowing them.The same insistence on partnership belongs in diplomacy. Dialogue with North Korea is worth pursuing, but Seoul cannot be a spectator in talks between Washington and Pyongyang. South Korea, the sovereign country most directly affected by any bargain, must remain at the table.Administrations change. Negotiations fail. Personal relationships fade. Korea cannot control those cycles, and it should stop measuring the alliance solely by Washington’s political mood. It can, however, build a strategic position of its own. When Korean know-how becomes integral to American industry, defense production and Indo-Pacific deterrence, political neglect becomes more costly. That is the practical meaning of “mutual indispensability” — and the strongest foundation Seoul can build for a sustainable Korea-US alliance.- - -Man-Ki KimMan-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yoon & Yang LLC. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed