The lack of scrutiny is troubling, given that the government has subsequently argued that the new mechanism can also be used as a template for judicial appointments
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It is unfortunate that Parliament passed the Tribunal Reforms Bill, 2026 without sufficiently addressing the issues that have surfaced in the decades-long executive-judiciary dispute over tribunal administration. The lack of scrutiny is troubling, given that the government has subsequently argued that the new mechanism can also be used as a template for judicial appointments.Superficially, the Bill, that has since become an Act post Presidential assent, does not appear to be a mere legislative override of the judiciary’s sustained pushback against the executive’s actions. This stand-off culminated in the Madras Bar Association judgment, 2025, in which the Court struck down the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021. Now comes the latest statute that attempts to address judicial concerns: tenure is altered to five years, the selection panel has been modified and, most significantly, a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) has been created. However, the real test of the Act lies in whether it addresses the Constitutional principle of separation of powers — a body exercising judicial functions cannot be formed and controlled by the executive whose actions it will adjudicate. On the face of it, the Act has created an appointing body, the NTC, that however creates an illusion of neutrality in tribunal appointments.Under Section 5, the Chairperson and members of the NTC are Government appointed. For the Chairperson and judicial members, the Government consults the Chief Justice. There is no such consultation for technical members. The Government can argue that the NTC design, 3:2 majority of judicial members, provides sufficient autonomy. But independence is about who appoints them, who controls the institution’s machinery and who exercises coercive power over its members. And on the last point, the Act again leaves the executive’s hand firmly on the tiller. Similarly, the Act keeps both appointment and removal of tribunal members substantially with the executive. The NTC recommends tribunal members through its Search-cum-Selection Committees in which a Government secretary is a voting member. The executive’s role extends to removal: under Section 16, the ministry administering the tribunal can initiate a preliminary inquiry, after which the NTC conducts an inquiry and makes a recommendation, but the Central Government takes the final action.The Supreme Court is bound to react. However, the judiciary must concede that the opaque collegium system should go. What is needed is a radical approach, such as the one adopted in the UK through the Constitutional Reforms Act, 2005 which created the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) to appoint judges as well as tribunal members. Most JAC commissioners are appointed through open competition, while others come through the Judges’ and Tribunal Judges’ Councils. The JAC recruits judges and tribunal members through a competitive process by advertising vacancies. This process alone can ensure genuine autonomy of the judiciary.Published on August 23, 2026
