A recent report revealed that the US Department of Defense is drafting a new nuclear strategy that is oriented toward protecting its allies through the possible use of short-range tactical nuclear weapons in the case of a regional war with China or Russia. If the US were to actually follow through with that strategy, tactical nuclear weapons would be forward deployed to Korea and Japan, two US allies in East Asia, triggering a whirlwind of change. While such a deployment certainly would appear to benefit security, as it would lend credence to the US’ pledge for extended deterrence, it could also lead to perilous outcomes by triggering a nuclear arms race and lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The Korean government should closely monitor developments on this issue within the US and properly prepare itself for any and all contingencies that may arise due to this change. NBC reported Wednesday that the draft of the new US nuclear strategy, overseen by Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s policy chief, outlines a shift away from long-range tactical missiles, placing greater emphasis on short-range tactical nuclear weapons. From a US standpoint, the idea is that if a regional conflict escalates, it would be contained at the level of tactical nuclear weapons rather than progressing to a strategic nuclear exchange. In theory, this reduces the risk of a full-scale nuclear war in which strategic nuclear weapons could inflict catastrophic damage on the US itself. If this report is true, it is highly likely that the US’ short-range tactical nuclear weapons will be deployed to East Asia instead of Europe. Europe already has nuclear-weapons states, such as the UK and France, and other countries like Germany house US tactical nukes. In comparison, the US withdrew all its tactical nuclear weapons from Korea at the end of 1991, effectively making East Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone. If the US decides to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to East Asia, both Korea and Japan will have to make some consequential political decisions. Korea will have to officially scrap the long-upheld 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan will have to delete the clause in its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, announced in 1967, that declares it will “not permit the introduction of nuclear weapons” to the country. In light of advancements in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, there have recently been calls in Korea and Japan for the US to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the two countries. But the real issue is what will happen after any such redeployment of nuclear weapons to US allies in the region. The forward deployment of nuclear weapons by the US could be perceived as a threat by North Korea, China and Russia, thus triggering a full-blown nuclear buildup. In short, the US’ attempt to prevent a full-out nuclear war could, in fact, paradoxically lead to a situation that lowers the use threshold for tactical nuclear weapons. Whatever the outcome may be, it is clear that Korea will suffer immensely. Seoul needs to define its position clearly so it can make informed decisions about the most effective path toward achieving lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.