Swati KhandelwalAug 04, 2026AI Security / DevSecOps

Google deleted three AI agent workflows from its Agent Development Kit (ADK) Python repository. Pillar Security showed that a public GitHub issue could manipulate a triage agent into triggering a privileged code-fixing agent.

The researchers said the public agent could be prompt-injected into posting /adk-issue-fix as adk-bot. They identified the bot as a collaborator, so that comment satisfied the privileged workflow's owner, member, or collaborator gate. The trusted bot identity became the authorization bridge.

The team demonstrated arbitrary code execution on the continuous integration (CI) runner and exfiltration of the bot personal access token (PAT). The privileged job also held a Google API key and a Google Cloud service-account credential. Its researcher-controlled proof-of-concept attacks do not identify in-the-wild exploitation or a compromised ADK release.

The exposed component was the repository automation, not a flaw in the distributed ADK Python package. For similar repositories, Pillar recommends separate bot identities, narrower token and tool scopes, and an authorization signal that untrusted text cannot generate.