The decision of the Federal High Court sitting in Lokoja to set aside its earlier judgment directing the registration of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) has raised far-reaching legal and political questions that go beyond the fate of a single political party. At the heart of the controversy lies a fundamental question of law: can a judge, having delivered a final judgment, subsequently turn around and set aside that same judgment?
For centuries, the answer has been largely settled by the doctrine of functus officio. Once a court has heard a matter and delivered its final judgment, it is deemed to have exhausted its jurisdiction over that dispute. The court has performed its function. Its assignment is complete. Any party dissatisfied with the decision is expected to proceed to the Court of Appeal and not return to the same judge asking him to review, reverse, or nullify his own judgment.
This principle is not a technical legal ritual. It is one of the pillars upon which judicial certainty rests. Without it, there would be no end to litigation. Every losing party would simply return to the same court hoping for a different outcome.
Nigerian courts have consistently defended this principle. In Arogundade Samuel Musa v. Obayemi Toyin & Ors, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that once a court delivers a final judgment, it becomes functus officio and lacks the power to revisit the merits of the matter. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held the same position in a long line of authorities. The law is clear that a judge cannot sit on appeal over his own decision.
