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Or sign-in if you have an account.A Canadian flag flies during the Canada Day Celebrations in the Old Port in Montreal, Que. Photo by ANDREJ IVANOV/AFP via Getty Images filesCanada’s Defence Industrial Strategy is the most ambitious industrial policy this country has produced in a generation. The numbers are striking: $180 billion in domestic defence procurement, a projected 240 per cent increase in industry revenues, 125,000 new jobs and more than half-a-trillion dollars in total economic activity by 2035. The government has been explicit that this is not simply a defence plan — it is an economic transformation, a deliberate effort to build a sovereign industrial base capable of sustaining Canadian security without chronic dependence on foreign suppliers. The strategic logic is sound. The sequencing, however, contains a risk that deserves more attention than it has received.Subscribe now to read the latest news in your city and across Canada.Exclusive articles from Barbara Shecter, Joe O'Connor, Gabriel Friedman, and others.Daily content from Financial Times, the world's leading global business publication.Unlimited online access to read articles from Financial Post, National Post and 15 news sites across Canada with one account.National Post ePaper, an electronic replica of the print edition to view on any device, share and comment on.Daily puzzles, including the New York Times Crossword.Subscribe now to read the latest news in your city and across Canada.Exclusive articles from Barbara Shecter, Joe O'Connor, Gabriel Friedman and others.Daily content from Financial Times, the world's leading global business publication.Unlimited online access to read articles from Financial Post, National Post and 15 news sites across Canada with one account.National Post ePaper, an electronic replica of the print edition to view on any device, share and comment on.Daily puzzles, including the New York Times Crossword.Create an account or sign in to continue with your reading experience.Access articles from across Canada with one account.Share your thoughts and join the conversation in the comments.Enjoy additional articles per month.Get email updates from your favourite authors.Create an account or sign in to continue with your reading experience.Access articles from across Canada with one accountShare your thoughts and join the conversation in the commentsEnjoy additional articles per monthGet email updates from your favourite authorsSign In or Create an AccountorCanada will spend the money. That much is not seriously in question. Defence budgets have been committed, NATO obligations are being met and the procurement pipeline is beginning to move. The real question — the one the DIS has not yet answered — is whether that spending builds the sovereign industrial capacity the strategy promises, or whether it quietly reverts to the path of least resistance: buying capability from allies, primarily the United States, with Canadian industrial participation as an afterthought.FP Work touches on HR strategy, labour economics, office culture, technology and more.By signing up you consent to receive the above newsletter from Postmedia Network Inc.A welcome email is on its way. If you don't see it, please check your junk folder.The next issue of Work will soon be in your inbox.We encountered an issue signing you up. Please try againThat reversion is entirely possible. And the mechanism by which it happens is not procurement failure or political will. It is a workforce gap that the strategy has acknowledged but not yet solved.The 125,000 jobs figure is the DIS’s most visible economic promise. It appears in budget documents, ministerial speeches and industry communications as a settled outcome. It is, in fact, a projection — and one that lacks the analytical scaffolding needed to make it credible.The government’s own State of Canada’s Defence Industry report for 2026 puts the total defence sector economic impact at 81,800 jobs, blending direct employment of roughly 36,000 with indirect and induced effects.It is not publicly clear whether the 125,000 represents net new positions above that blended baseline, direct jobs only, or a further aggregate. No public document breaks the target down by occupation, skill level, timeline, or region. There is no published gap analysis comparing today’s workforce to what the DIS’s ten sovereign capability areas will actually require.This matters for a simple reason: Without a defined workforce requirement, the Canada Defence Skills Agenda — the $383 million program meant to build that workforce — is investing without a plan. Good intentions and real dollars are not a substitute for a rigorous labour market needs assessment that tells industry, provinces and training institutions what to build toward and when. That assessment should exist, should be independent and should be updated annually.Ottawa’s Spring Economic Update 2026 acknowledges a structural shortage of more than 20,000 skilled trades workers annually. The government’s response, Team Canada Strong targeting 80,000 to 100,000 new Red Seal tradespeople by 2030-31, lists defence as one of four priorities alongside housing, infrastructure and resource development.That is a crowded queue. All four sectors will compete for the same apprentices, the same instructors and the same provincial training capacity. And on current terms, defence is not well-positioned to win that competition. Housing and infrastructure offer simpler entry, faster clearances and more familiar career pathways. The apprenticeship system is already losing ground: fewer than 34,000 of 100,000 new registrants completed in 2024. Adding more entrants to a pipeline with a two-thirds attrition rate does not solve the problem.If the defence industrial base cannot secure its share of the trades workforce, the most capital-intensive programs in the DIS — shipbuilding, ammunition production, armoured vehicle manufacturing — will face the same execution risk that has plagued Canadian defence programs for decades: not a lack of money or political commitment, but a shortage of people qualified and available to do the work. The result is schedule slippage, cost escalation and ultimately a return to foreign procurement to fill the gap.A dedicated defence-sector stream within the trades pipeline — with ring-fenced capacity, curriculum aligned to sovereign capability requirements and structured employer commitments — is not a luxury. It is the mechanism by which the DIS’s industrial ambition becomes executable.The DIS leans heavily on small and medium-sized businesses as the engine of industrial growth — and rightly so. SMBs represent more than 90 per cent of firms in the Canadian defence sector. They are also the most exposed to workforce gaps and the least equipped to absorb them.A prime contractor can carry cleared staff between contracts, offer competitive salaries and maintain HR infrastructure capable of navigating complex training systems. An SMB typically cannot. When skilled workers are scarce, they flow toward larger, more stable employers — which means the supply chain depth the DIS requires may never fully develop, regardless of how much capital is directed at it. Workforce scarcity at the SMB level doesn’t show up as a single visible failure; it shows up as chronic underperformance against industrial targets, program delays and a slow drift back toward foreign subcontracting. It is the quiet risk inside the quiet risk.The most promising structural response lies in dual and multi-use technology firms — companies operating simultaneously in commercial and defence markets. This is where Canada has genuine and underexploited competitive advantage. Dual-use firms in areas like AI, quantum, autonomous systems, advanced sensors and cybersecurity are growing organically, attract engineering and technology talent without requiring workers to self-identify as defence industry and produce capabilities with applications across both civilian and military domains. Critically, their commercial revenue base provides the financial stability that pure-play defence SMBs rarely achieve.A workforce incentive framework that explicitly prioritizes dual-use firms — through targeted R&D tax credits, preferential access to Skills Agenda funding, apprenticeship wage subsidies calibrated to technology roles, and streamlined access to defence procurement — would do two things at once: grow the industrial capacity the DIS needs and build it on a foundation commercially sustainable enough to survive the inevitable gaps between defence contracts. It would also accelerate the development of exactly the sovereign capability areas — digital systems, AI, quantum, space — that the strategy identifies as priorities but has done the least to staff. Security clearance timelines, administrative portability between contractors, and pre-clearance pathways for students in designated programs are also part of the solution — but they are implementation details within a larger structural problem that starts with how the government defines and incentivizes the industrial base it is trying to build.Canada has a long and expensive history of defence procurement that generated less domestic industrial benefit than promised. The NSS has made genuine progress; other programs less so. The DIS is a sincere attempt to break that pattern — to use the defence budget as a deliberate instrument of industrial development rather than simply a means of equipping the military.But industrial development requires workers. Sovereign capability requires people with the right skills, the right clearances, and a reason to build their careers in this sector rather than another. Without the workforce foundation in place, the money will still get spent. The equipment will still get procured. The question is simply whether it gets built here, by Canadians, in facilities that will still be operating in 2045 — or whether the path of least resistance quietly wins again.That is the risk. And it is one the government still has time to address, but the clock is ticking.Mark Norman is a retired vice-admiral who commanded Canada’s Navy and was vice-chief of defence. He advises several Canadian defence companies. Join the Conversation This website uses cookies to personalize your content (including ads), and allows us to analyze our traffic. Read more about cookies here. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.