If the United States joins Israel’s fight to try to finish Israel’s job, it will enter into a war of unknowable scope against a country of 90 million people
T
wo decades ago, as Americans debated whether their country should invade Iraq, one question loomed the largest: did Saddam Hussein possess weapons of mass destruction? If so, the implication was that the United States should disarm and overthrow his regime by military force. If not, Washington could keep that option in reserve and continue to contain Saddam through economic sanctions and routine bombings.
In time, the implications of the Iraq war far exceeded the boundaries of the original debate. Saddam, it turned out, had no weapons of mass destruction. But suppose he had possessed the chemical and biological agents that the war’s advocates claimed. Invading his country to destroy his regime would have given him the greatest possible incentive to use the worst weapons at his disposal. The war would have been just as mistaken — more so, in fact.
For the same reason, the matter of WMD hardly explains the war’s genesis or its ultimate consequences. The advocates of invasion, it is true, didn’t want Saddam to build his supposed arsenal and potentially go nuclear. More important, however, they saw an opportunity to assert America’s dominance on the global stage after the country was struck on 9/11. They wanted to remake the Middle East and demonstrate American power. That they did, just not as they hoped.
