The reform was necessary
The fundamental logic behind Agnipath remains sound. India cannot indefinitely maintain a manpower-heavy military in which a growing proportion of the defence budget is consumed by salaries and pensions, leaving less for modernisation.The armed forces need to become younger, leaner and technologically more capable. The pension bill cannot be reduced merely by tinkering with pension rules. The more durable solution is to change the manpower architecture itself. That was the rationale behind my support, although with reservations, for a short-service engagement even before Agnipath was announced.However, a sound strategic objective does not automatically produce a sound scheme.Agnipath was introduced in 2022 with a four-year engagement and fixed pay of Rs 30,000–40,000, after which up to 25 per cent of each batch could be selected for permanent service. The remaining 75 per cent would leave without a pension but with a Seva Nidhi package and other transition benefits. The controversy that followed was predictable, and not merely political. It raised legitimate questions about training, military effectiveness, morale, retention, compensation and the employability of those leaving after four years.Four years later, we can move beyond the policy and examine the evidence.Four years may be too short
