A vendor publishes a safety stat: 1.2 million checks, 80 quarantined. It reads like a measurement. It is half of one.
The missing half is the population that mattered. How many bad requests actually arrived? How many unsafe tool calls went through? How many workflows completed cleanly because nothing fired? The public record cannot answer any of that, because the record format was never built to hold the other side.
A block is an event. Something stopped, a reason code got written, a quarantine object landed in storage, and a review status may show up later. An allow is ordinary traffic. It looks exactly like the request that should have been allowed, which is the whole problem. The system writes down catches because catches interrupt execution, and it loses misses because a miss and a success are byte-identical from the logger's point of view.
That is not a vendor being cagey. That is the guard's architecture deciding, in advance, which side of the ledger will ever be legible.
The catch ledger audits itself
