On June 29, the Faizabad Bar Association was reported to have resolved that none of its members would represent the eight men arrested in the Ram Temple donations embezzlement case. Any lawyer who wished to represent them would first have to deposit Rs 5 lakh fine per accused into the association’s account.The reason given by its president and secretary was that the alleged theft had hurt members’ sentiments.The association has since denied that a resolution was ever passed, saying instead that lawyers chose individually not to represent the accused because they are devotees of Ram and their sentiments are hurt by the alleged theft.The constitutional problem is the same either way: a coordinated withdrawal of legal representation on grounds of religious sentiment is still a denial of a fundamental right.Such withdrawals of legal representation are constitutionally indefensible. The Supreme Court’s 2010 judgment in AS Mohammed Rafi v State of Tamil Nadu settled this: such withdrawals are “wholly illegal, against all traditions and professional ethics”. Article 22(1) guarantees every arrested person the fundamental right to counsel of their choice.Functionally, the denial of legal representation is closer to a religious and moral verdict – delivered as the individual choice of lawyers in Faizabad. The suspects are assumed guilty, instead of being presumed innocent until proven guilty.By the accusation alone, the lawyers have placed the suspects outside the pale of fundamental rights. That is the logic of “dharma rakshati rakshataha” (those who violate the sacred order forfeit its protection), even though the association has not explicitly invoked dharma.The Gita and the ConstitutionThe Mohammed Rafi judgment is correct on the constitutional principle. But its reasoning must be read carefully, because it reveals something about the court’s own normative architecture.To establish that lawyers must defend even the most reprehensible accused, the judgement marshals an unusual range of authority: Thomas Erskine, who defended Thomas Paine in Britain in 1792 at the cost of his position as Attorney-General; Powell v Alabama, in which the wrongful capital convictions of nine Black teenagers in 1930s Alabama established a constitutional right to counsel; the Indian National Army trials in the 1940s and the case of Binayak Sen, the doctor accused of aiding Maoists.Then, closing the judgement, the Bhagavad Gita: “It is the duty of a lawyer to defend no matter what the consequences, and a lawyer who refuses to do so is not following the message of the Gita.”Article 22(1) of the Constitution appears, but as one instrument among several – flanked by British legal history, American constitutional law, Indian nationalist legal tradition and finally the Gita. The Constitution shares space with a post-colonial Anglo-Saxon tradition supplying the aspirational examples, and dharmic duty supplying the ultimate ground of obligation.STORY | Ram temple donation theft: Ayodhya Bar resolves not to defend accused; penalty for violatorsThe Faizabad Bar Association on Monday resolved that none of its members would represent the eight accused arrested in the alleged embezzlement of donations received at the Ram… pic.twitter.com/oaP167mSX3— Press Trust of India (@PTI_News) June 29, 2026
For the bar and the bench, why is the Constitution inadequate?
Recent incidents saw the Faizabad Bar Association and the chief justice of India seeking out extra-constitutional authorities to defend their positions.







