Opinion: The agreement’s true test lies beyond Hezbollah’s disarmament: whether Lebanon can rebuild Shiite communities, restore livelihoods and prevent alienation from deepening among those left displaced and vulnerableNoa Riven|Yet amid the diplomatic and security discussions, the Shiite community has almost disappeared from the conversation — the community that bore the brunt of the fighting and paid the heaviest price. The question is not only whether the agreement will weaken Hezbollah, but whether it will bring the Shiites back into the Lebanese state or deepen their sense of alienation from it.On June 26, 2026, Israel and Lebanon signed a U.S.-brokered framework agreement to end the confrontation and restore Lebanon’s sovereignty over all of its territory (Photo: REUTERS/Ken Cedeno)The agreement’s Article 3 stipulates that the Lebanese army will gradually assume security responsibility in “pilot areas” alongside the withdrawal of the IDF. Only after the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure are verified will international reconstruction efforts begin: rebuilding homes, repairing infrastructure and restoring civilian services.This is the key to the agreement, but also its weakness. Reconstruction is conditional on disarmament and security progress, while in the meantime Israel continues to hold territory, villages remain inaccessible and thousands of Shiites continue to live as displaced people. The agreement promises them a future, but does not provide a solution to the problem.For secular Shiites and opponents of Hezbollah, the agreement is a historic opportunity. It could return control of the border and decisions on war and peace to the state, finally separating Shiite identity from dependence on an armed organization subordinate to Iran’s regional agenda.Lebanese Shiite journalist Mohammad Barakat, one of Hezbollah’s prominent critics, views the agreement as a wake-up call for the Shiite community. In his view, it could allow the community to return to the state, the army and civilian institutions, while exposing the failure of the model Hezbollah offered: promises of security, victory and reconstruction that in practice left behind destruction, displacement and loss.But this is where the agreement’s major gap becomes clear: Even if the state commits to reconstruction, it remains unclear who will rebuild the villages, compensate families, restore livelihoods and assist those who cannot return as long as Israel remains in the area. A promise of reconstruction is not a reconstruction plan, especially not in a country suffering from economic collapse and deep institutional weakness.This is also the difference between weakening Hezbollah and creating a genuine alternative to it. The organization can be pushed away from the border and responsibility can be transferred to the Lebanese army, but it cannot be replaced with declarations and words written on a page. If the state does not provide security, aid and reconstruction in practice, it will not separate the Shiite public from the organization. Instead, it will leave them weaker, more vulnerable and convinced that they have once again been abandoned.Dr. Noa RivenThe danger is particularly acute among Hezbollah supporters. In their eyes, they are being asked to give up the force seen as the community’s protector, while Israel remains on the ground and the state has yet to prove that it is capable of defending them. The agreement could therefore be perceived not as a restoration of sovereignty, but as an Israeli-American move that the Lebanese government is helping impose on the Shiites.This is the real test of the agreement: not only whether Hezbollah will be disarmed, but who will fill the vacuum that emerges. Sovereignty is not limited to raising a flag, deploying soldiers or words written on a page. The state must provide shelter for the displaced, compensate families and establish a dedicated reconstruction authority to oversee rebuilding villages, restoring livelihoods and returning life to them.If the state succeeds in doing so, the agreement could open a genuine path for the Shiites back into the Lebanese state. If it fails, it will not only miss a historic opportunity — it will give Hezbollah its strongest argument: The state demands that the Shiites give up their weapons, but once again leaves them to fend for themselves.Dr. Noa Riven is a research fellow at MECARC at Ariel University, a member of the Dvorah Forum and a lecturer on the Middle East and Islam.