On the ground, the Iranian regime has begun carrying out some of its threats to widen the conflict by opening two new border fronts. The first is in the southern Red Sea, through threats by the Houthis to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The second is in the northern Arabian Gulf, through direct and unprecedented threats against Kuwait.For all the latest headlines, follow our Google News channel online or via the app.The danger of this shift is not limited to Kuwait or the Red Sea, but extends across the entire regional security system. Iran is no longer confining the confrontation to its original parties, namely the United States and Israel. Instead, it is shifting the conflict to neighboring countries and strategic waterways. This behavior is less a defensive reaction than a reflection of a strategic direction that Iran’s military project has been developing for decades, based on expanding its influence and geopolitical control over surrounding countries.The statements being issued by Iranian institutions warrant close attention, particularly as threats against Kuwait have intensified. The Tasnim News Agency has published statements strikingly similar to those issued by Baghdad before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Tehran is using the limited US military presence in Kuwait as a pretext for a possible attack, while ignoring the fact that this presence dates back decades and primarily serves as a deterrent against any potential invasion. Kuwait was also not a principal base for the recent US military operations against Iran.The question today is: How should Kuwait, together with the Gulf states, respond to this threat?The challenge extends beyond the capabilities of individual states and requires a return to the concept of collective action through the creation of a cohesive regional front, supported by an international coalition that clearly rejects any pretexts for expanding the war or legitimizing attacks against neighboring countries. Washington may not be expected to lead the diplomatic initiative while it is preoccupied with managing the military confrontation. However, it can establish clear red lines affirming that the security of the Gulf and its maritime routes falls within its highest strategic interests. Iran has not limited itself to verbal threats against Kuwait. It has repeatedly struck water and electricity facilities and expanded the scope of its threats to include Bahrain as well.Tehran appears to understand that a tightening naval blockade of its ports, together with the possibility of expanded US operations along its coastline, could cause it to lose its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, one of its most important tools of pressure during both the war and negotiations. It is therefore attempting to create alternative sources of leverage. These include turning Bab al-Mandeb into a point of strategic coercion through the Houthis and seeking to impose a new security reality in the northern Gulf. Although the circumstances are different, this effort evokes certain features of Saddam Hussein’s policy of imposing facts on the ground in 1990.Iranian behavior has developed a recurring pattern. Whenever Tehran loses a strategic card, it quickly opens a new front in an attempt to recreate its instruments of pressure and coercion. To reduce the political and legal costs, and to avoid appearing as a directly aggressive state, it is likely to rely more heavily on its regional proxies, including Yemeni and Iraqi militias.What are the chances that this new Iranian positioning will succeed?The answer is not straightforward, because an analysis of Iranian behavior cannot be based solely on conventional assumptions of rationality. The Iranian leadership is also confronting complex domestic calculations and fears that any perception of defeat could destabilize its position at home, particularly after it spent decades diverting the country’s resources toward building military capabilities and financing wars.The Houthis in Yemen appear to have been assigned the task of turning Bab al-Mandeb into an operational alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, as Iran’s ability to use the latter as a pressure tool declines because of US military attacks. With the Houthis already moving to threaten maritime navigation, Yemeni forces, together with the Saudi-led coalition, are likely to receive regional and international support to prevent the disruption of one of the world’s most important arteries of global trade.The expected response will not necessarily be limited to the military dimension. Diplomatic opportunities may be broader on this particular front. Major powers that depend on shipping through the Red Sea, led by China and India, as well as European states, have a direct interest in guaranteeing freedom of navigation. Any military action aimed at ending the Houthi threat to the maritime route could therefore receive broader international support, as it would be presented as a defense of the principle of freedom of international navigation rather than as an extension of the war taking place in the Gulf.In all cases, building this regional and international coalition is no longer merely a political option. It has become a strategic necessity, not only to confront current threats, but also to deal with any arrangements that may emerge from the outcome of the war in the future. Iran is not simply seeking to manage a temporary crisis. It is attempting to redraw the region’s strategic map according to its new narrative, so that it emerges from the war, even if the fighting ends early, with spheres of influence and rules of engagement different from those that existed before the conflict. The debate, therefore, is no longer only about how to end the war, but also about the shape of the regional order that will emerge afterward.