China and Pakistan appear to be testing a wider diplomatic geometry around their All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership. The clearest signal is the accumulation of formats, including China–Afghanistan–Pakistan talks, a new Bangladesh–China–Pakistan mechanism and closer coordination over the Gulf crisis.
That pattern can be called China–Pakistan Plus. The term should be read narrowly — as an attempt by Beijing and Islamabad to use their bilateral core as a scaffold for selective third-party engagement, not as a new alliance or settled regional architecture.
The strongest case is perhaps Afghanistan. Pakistan’s relationship with Kabul has historically been unstable, as border closures, violence and hard public statements have limited diplomacy. This is why the China–Afghanistan–Pakistan trilateral — originating in 2012, upgraded in 2015 and formalised since 2017 — is significant. In May 2025, Beijing said Kabul and Islamabad had agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors, while the same process supported discussion of extending the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. In April 2026, representatives from the three sides held week-long informal talks in Xinjiang even as tensions persisted.
