For decades, the international order functioned on an assumption that now appears increasingly fragile: that political legitimacy, economic direction and strategic leadership would continue to flow primarily from the West. The institutions that emerged after World War II — from the Bretton Woods system to the United Nations Security Council — reflected this concentration of power. Even after the Cold War ended, the US and its European allies remained the principal architects of global discourse.GDPThat era is not disappearing overnight. The West still possesses overwhelming military power, technological superiority, financial influence and institutional reach. Yet the assumption that the rest of the world will merely follow western priorities without asserting independent interests is steadily collapsing. What we are witnessing today is not the decline of the West in absolute terms, but the unmistakable political awakening of the Global South.The phrase Global South is often misunderstood as merely a geographical description. In reality, it represents a political and economic category — nations across Asia, Africa, Latin America and parts of West Asia that historically remained outside the centres of global power. These countries were once viewed largely through the lens of aid, instability or dependency. Today, many of them are becoming engines of growth, energy markets, manufacturing hubs and increasingly assertive diplomatic actors.The numbers themselves reveal the scale of the transformation. BRICS nations now account for a larger share of global GDP in purchasing power parity terms than the G7 economies. Recent economic estimates place BRICS at roughly 35% of global GDP at PPP, compared to about 30% for the G7. The expanded BRICS grouping also represents nearly half of the world’s population and a growing share of global energy consumption and commodity trade.The implications are profound. For nearly two centuries, economic power remained concentrated within a relatively narrow Atlantic world. Today, that concentration is visibly shifting eastward and southward. Asia now contributes the majority of global economic growth, while Africa is projected to account for nearly one-quarter of the world’s population by 2050. These are not peripheral demographic trends; they are structural transformations that will reshape labour markets, consumption patterns, geopolitical alignments and strategic influence. Multipolarity, therefore, is no longer merely a diplomatic slogan. It is becoming an economic fact.India embodies this transformation perhaps more visibly than any other major democracy in the developing world. The International Monetary Fund has projected India to remain among the fastest-growing major economies, with growth rates significantly above most advanced Western economies over the coming years. More importantly, India is expected to become one of the world’s three largest economies within the next decade if current trajectories continue.But India’s rise is not significant merely because of GDP rankings. Its deeper significance lies in the emergence of a foreign policy vocabulary that increasingly resonates across the developing world: strategic autonomy rather than bloc dependency. This shift became particularly visible during the Russia-Ukraine war. Much of the Western world expected broad international isolation of Moscow. Instead, several Asian, African and Latin American nations adopted calibrated positions shaped by national interests rather than moral alignment with either bloc. India continued purchasing discounted Russian oil while simultaneously strengthening strategic ties with the US and Europe. Critics in western capitals described this as opportunism. Yet from the perspective of many developing nations, it represented sovereign realism.The same pattern emerged during debates surrounding Gaza, debt restructuring, climate financing and global trade rules. Increasingly, countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America are refusing to accept frameworks designed primarily around western priorities while their own concerns remain secondary. This is the central geopolitical reality many Western policymakers still underestimate: The Global South is not demanding charity, sympathy or rhetorical acknowledgement. It is demanding power.This frustration is not entirely unfounded. The post-war global order promised universalism but often practised selective morality. Military interventions in Iraq and Libya, inconsistent approaches towards international law, unequal vaccine access during the pandemic, and delayed climate finance commitments have weakened the moral authority of many western democracies in the eyes of the developing world.None of this means the Global South is morally superior or politically unified. That would be a romantic illusion. The so-called Global South is deeply fragmented by ideology, governance models, economic inequality and regional rivalries. China and India compete intensely despite sharing platforms like BRICS. African nations themselves differ sharply in priorities and political systems. Several developing countries continue to struggle with authoritarianism, corruption, instability and democratic backsliding.Critics, therefore, argue that the celebration of the Global South is exaggerated rhetoric lacking institutional coherence. Several western strategic thinkers continue to argue that BRICS remains more symbolic than structural — a loose grouping united largely by dissatisfaction with the existing order rather than by a coherent alternative vision. They point out, correctly, that the G7 still dominates advanced technology, reserve currencies, global finance, higher education, innovation ecosystems and military alliances. The US alone continues to account for roughly one-quarter of global GDP in nominal terms and remains the centre of the international financial architecture.Others argue that the rhetoric of strategic autonomy often masks selective opportunism. India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil during the Ukraine war, for instance, was criticised by sections of Western media as moral inconsistency. Similarly, critics warn that China’s expanding influence within BRICS risks transforming the Global South into another hierarchy dominated by a different great power. These criticisms deserve serious consideration because they contain elements of truth. A multipolar world is not automatically a more just world. Emerging powers are fully capable of pursuing their own strategic ambitions with little concern for universal principles.Yet these criticisms do not invalidate the central reality: the monopoly over global decision-making is weakening. In fact, many of the criticisms directed at the Global South unintentionally reveal precisely why the existing order is under strain. When developing nations are expected to align automatically with western geopolitical priorities but receive limited representation within global institutions, resentment becomes inevitable. When climate obligations are imposed unevenly despite vastly different historical carbon footprints, distrust deepens. When international law appears uncompromising in some conflicts yet negotiable in others, the language of rules-based order begins to lose credibility.Strategic autonomy, therefore, should not be dismissed as fence-sitting. For many emerging nations, it represents the diplomacy of self-respect. Countries that experienced colonialism, economic dependency and external intervention are naturally reluctant to become instruments within another great-power rivalry. The Global South no longer seeks symbolic inclusion within institutions designed by others. It seeks structural influence over the rules themselves.Perhaps the clearest sign of this transformation is psychological rather than institutional. For much of the twentieth century, development itself was imagined largely through western templates. Political legitimacy, economic liberalisation and even cultural aspiration were frequently measured against Euro-American models.That intellectual monopoly is now weakening. Countries are increasingly searching for multiple models of modernity. Gulf economies are diversifying beyond oil through ambitious state-led transformation. Southeast Asian nations are building hybrid economic systems that combine markets with strong state coordination. India is attempting to fuse technological modernisation with civilisational self-confidence and welfare expansion. Africa, with its demographic explosion and expanding urbanisation, is emerging as one of the most strategically contested regions of the twenty-first century. The developing world no longer seeks charity from the West; it seeks parity.The world is entering an era where influence will be negotiated rather than inherited. That transition will inevitably produce instability. Established powers rarely surrender strategic dominance gracefully, while emerging powers often overestimate their own coherence and moral authority. Yet history moves through redistributions of power, not through permanent monopolies.The 20th century belonged largely to the Atlantic order. The 21st century is increasingly being shaped by the Indo-Pacific, Africa’s demographic rise and the strategic awakening of the developing world.For India, this transition presents both opportunity and responsibility. India possesses rare advantages in this emerging order: demographic scale, democratic legitimacy, technological capacity, military weight and civilisational depth. Unlike China, it is not viewed with the same degree of strategic suspicion across large parts of the democratic world. Unlike many Western powers, it carries the historical memory of colonialism rather than the legacy of colonial dominance. That combination gives India unusual diplomatic credibility across competing geopolitical spaces because it is not perceived merely as an extension of western strategic power.But leadership of the Global South cannot be sustained through rhetoric alone. India must strengthen domestic institutions, expand manufacturing competitiveness, invest more deeply in research and higher education, and translate diplomatic symbolism into economic partnerships that genuinely benefit smaller nations. Equally important, India must avoid the temptation of reducing the Global South to anti-western sentiment. That would be strategically shortsighted. The future of global politics is unlikely to be defined by a simplistic East-versus-West binary. Rather, it will be shaped by flexible coalitions, overlapping interests and issue-based partnerships.The Global South is no longer waiting for permission to shape the future. It has already entered the room where the future is being negotiated, and the only question now is whether the existing powers of the international order are prepared to accept that the age of unquestioned western centrality is gradually coming to an end.(The views expressed are personal)This article is authored by Debika Dutta, columnist and teacher, Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Mangaldai, Darrang, Assam.